James Giordano: "Neuroscience, Neurotechnology, and Strivings to Flourish" [CFI conference on biomedical enhancement]

James Giordano now talking about Neuroscience, Neurotechnology, and Strivings to Flourish.

One of his primary messages is that we need to be wary of anything with the prefix "neuro".

Neurotechnologic imperative: "...if you can build it, do so..."

Human flourishing prompts the questions:

1. What is it to flourish?
2. What is the "good"?
3. How is/should it be achieved? Means, ends, limits...

Contextualized to bio-psychosocial nature of our species. 

Flourishing:

• Maximizing function
• Does this mean maintaining or optimizing?
• Treatment or enhancement?
• Objectivity and/or subjectively?
• Consideration of gain vs. loss?
• Given bio-psychsocial nature, on what level(s)?

Janusian face of neuroscience: Utopian aspirations vs. dystopian anxieties

Pros and cons: A natural need to know and intervene inherent to human flourishing; inquiry and action is both right and good; partial knowledge in areas of profound impact effect broad and unforeseen consequences; there are intellectual and moral limits on inquiry. 

We should not retard progress, need to mitigate non-contemplative advancement. 

Cognitive liberty and right to one's mind

We've been having a great discussion here at Sentient Developments on cognitive liberty and neurodiversity thanks to our guest blogger, Casey Rae-Hunter. Be sure to check out his recent posts, "Neuroplasticity and Coordinated Cognition: the Means of Self-Mastery?", "Neurodiversity vs. Cognitive Liberty", "Neurodiversity vs. Cognitive Liberty, Round II."

I'd now like to take a moment and address some issues as they pertain to cognitive liberty, a topic that I believe will start to carry some heavy implications in the near future.

Cognitive liberty is not just about the right to modify one's mind, emotional balance and psychological framework (for example, through anti-depressants, cognitive enhancers, psychotropic substances, etc.), it's also very much about the right to not have one's mind altered against their will. In this sense, cognitive liberty is very closely tied to freedom of speech. A strong argument can be made that we have an equal right to freedom of thought and the sustained integrity of our subjective experiences.

Our society has a rather poor track record when it comes to respecting the validity of certain 'mind-types'. We once tried to "cure" homosexuality with conversion therapy. Today there's an effort to cure autism and Asperger's syndrome -- a development the autistic rights people have railed against. And in the future we may consider curing criminals of their anti-social or deviant behaviour -- a potentially thorny issue to be sure.

There are many shades of gray when it comes to this important issue. It's going to requiring considerable awareness and debate if we hope to get it right. Your very mind may be at stake.

Neuroethical conundrums

Forced cognitive modification is an issue that's affecting real people today.

Aspies for Freedom claims that the most common therapies for autism are exactly this; they argue that applied behaviour analysis (ABA) therapy and the forced suppression of stimming are unethical, dangerous and cruel, as well as aversion therapy, the use of restraints and alternative treatments like chelation. Jane Meyerding, an autistic person herself, has criticized any therapy which attempts to remove autistic behaviors which she contends are behaviors that help autistics to communicate.

As this example shows, the process of altering a certain mind-type, whether it be homosexuality or autism, can be suppressive and harsh. But does the end justify the means? If we could "cure" autistics in a safe and ethical way and introduce them to the world of neurotypicality should we do it? Many individuals in the autistic/Asperger's camp would say no, but there's clearly a large segment of the population who feel that these conditions are quite debilitating. Not an easy question to answer.

This is an issue of extreme complexity and sensitivity, particularly when considering other implications of neurological modification. Looking to the future, there will be opportunities to alter the minds of pedophiles and other criminals guilty of anti-social and harmful behaviors. Chemical castration may eventually make way to a nootropic or genetic procedure that removes tendencies deemed inappropriate or harmful by the state.

Is this an infringement of a person's cognitive liberty?

Neuroconformity vs. neurodiversity

Consider the deprogramming of individuals to help them escape the clutches of a cult. The term itself is quite revealing: notice that it's deprogramming, not reprogramming -- a suggestion that the person is being restored to a pre-existing condition.

But what about those cases like pedophilia or autism where there is no pre-existing psychological condition for those persons, save for whatever mind-state society deems to be appropriate? This is the (potential) danger of neuroconformism, the evil flipside to neurodiversity. Without a broad sense and appreciation for alternative mind-types we run the risk of re-engineering our minds into extreme homogeneity.

Now I'm not suggesting that we shouldn't treat sociopaths in this way. What I'm saying is that we need to tread this path very, very carefully. Manipulating minds in this way will have an irrevocable impact on a person's sense of self. In a very profound way, a person's previous self may actually be destroyed and replaced by a new version.

For us Buddhists this doesn't tend to be a problem as we deny the presence of a singular and immutable self; what we can agree on, however, is that our agency in the world is heavily impacted by our genetics and environment which leads to a fairly consistent psychology -- what we call personalities and tendencies. In most cases, we tend to become attached to our personality and tendencies -- it's what we like to call our 'self.' And it's perfectly appropriate to want to retain that consistent sense of self over time.

So, if one applies a strict interpretation of cognitive liberty, a case can be made that a sociopath deserves the right to refuse a treatment that would for all intents-and-purposes replace their old self with a new one. On the other hand, a case can also be made that a sociopathic criminal has forgone their right to cognitive liberty (in essence the same argument that allows us to imprison criminals and strip them of their rights) and cannot refuse a treatment which is intended to be rehabilitative.

I am admittedly on the fence with this one. My instinct tells me that we should never alter a person's mind against their will; my common sense tells me that removing sociopathic tendencies is a good thing and ultimately beneficial to that individual. I'm going to have to ruminate over this one a bit further...

As for autistism, however, I'm a bit more more comfortable suggesting that we shouldn't force autistics into neurotypicality. At the very least we should certainly refrain from behavior therapy and other draconian tactics, but I have nothing against educating autistics on how to better engage and interact with their larger community.

And to repeat a point I made earlier, we should err on the side of neurodiversity and a strong interpretation of cognitive liberty. The right to our own minds and thoughts is a very profound one. We need to be allowed to think and emote in the way that we want; the potential for institutions or governments to start mandating to us what they consider to be "normal thinking" is clearly problematic.

So fight for your right to your mind!

Neurodiversity vs. Cognitive Liberty, Round II

Casey Rae-Hunter is guest blogging this month.

I've taken some hits on my recent post about the possible differences (semantic and conceptual) between neurodiversity and cognitive liberty. Some of them have happened outside of the hallowed Sentient Developments grounds, as one particular individual does not cotton to the Blogger/Google comments protocol here at SD.

Mostly, the arguments have centered on a), my lack of specificity in articulating clear differences between the two terms and b), my assumption that those with Aspserger's Syndrome may be using neurodiversity as an excuse to advocate for an aggressive "hands-off" approach to neurological governance.

I'm writing this follow-up post to (hopefully) better explain why I think that neurodiversity and cognitive liberty — while sharing some similarities — are quite different animals.

Perhaps the best way to do this is to not focus on neurodiversity, as it can mean quite a few different things depending on your politics. At this point in history, theories of cognitive liberty will no doubt sound Philip K. Dick-ian, but it's never too early to start pondering the ethical and regulatory frameworks that impact societal attitudes and individual outcomes. In fact, George did a great job of itemizing these issues just the other day.

In case you missed it, below are my initial Principles for Cognitive Liberty, which I have expanded and clarified. Below that is a paragraph that should better illustrate some differences between neurodiversity and cognitive liberty (keep in mind that there are plenty of similarities).

1. Cognitive liberty is the basic right of an individual to pursue potentially beneficial psychological/neurological trajectories. If the individual is unable to make these choices themselves, than it is the right of their closest family members to make them, provided they are not coerced by the medical establishment or prevailing social strata.

2. Cognitive liberty recognizes that information and education are key to making informed choices. In the absence of such information, cognitive libertarians will advocate for the fullest range of data in when considering treatment options or lifestyle planning.

3. Cognitive liberty recognizes the range of psychological profiles in both the neurotypical world and otherwise. Until and unless an individual's psychology can be determined as infringing on another individual's cognitive liberty, they are free to pursue or not pursue strategies for conventional adaptation, possible enhancement or any other cognitive application — actual or postulatory.

4. Cognitive liberty recognizes the right to pharmacological experimentation, within existing legal structures. Where those structures are not beneficial or unnecessarily inhibit potentially useful individual research, cognitive libertarians reserve the right to challenge legal frameworks (and, where appropriate and with full comprehension of the punitive risks, step beyond them).

5. Cognitive liberty recognizes the essential function of the governmental regulatory apparatus, but places others' cognitive liberty ahead of the societal, legal or bureaucratic status quo. Through education, research and advocacy, cognitive libertarians can and should present information to policymakers that will enhance governmental comprehension of current and emerging issues. Where decisions are made, they must be transparent and open to debate.

6. Cognitive liberty is not an outlier of the neurodiversity movement. It is a separate, but complimentary effort to enhance understanding about the range of possibilities in self-directed cognition.

Once again, let's look at why this is different than neurodiversity.

A) Neurodiversity does not necessarily include an ethical framework for enhancement or targeted augmentation.

B) Neurodiversity may not currently recognize the efficacy of ethical "uplift" for the benefit of enhanced (or even equal) powers of cognition. Cognitive liberty leaves room for these discussions, while not advocating specifically for one or another approach.

C) Neurodiversity offers a necessary framework for human rights within the neurological and psychological spectrum, in which neurological pluralism is part of a new social contract. Cognitive liberty is not in opposition to these tenets, but is perhaps more concerned with the essential right of sentient beings to play an active part in shaping their cognitive destiny by available means.

This post may open a whole 'nother can of worms, but I certainly embrace any conversation or debate it inspires!

Casey Rae-Hunter is a writer, editor, musician, producer and self-proclaimed "lover of fine food and drink." He is the Communications Director of the Future of Music Coalition — a Washington, DC think tank that identifies, examines, interprets and translates issues at the intersection of music, law, technology and policy. He is also the founder and CEO of the Contrarian Media Group, which publishes The Contrarian and Autistic in the District — the latter a blog about Asperger's Syndrome.

IEET's Susan Schneider on transhumanism: Will enhancement destroy the "real you"?

Dr. Susan Schneider, IEET fellow, assistant professor of philosophy and an affiliated faculty member with Penns Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and the Institute for Research in Cognitive Science, speaks at a UPenn Media Seminar on Neuroscience and Society on philosophical controversies surrounding cognitive enhancement.

In this video, Schneider wonders if radical enhancement, particularly cognitive enhancement that gives rise to superintelligence, will result in the destruction of the original person in favor of something categorically different. Schneider also discusses uploading and the continuity of experience -- including the apparent problem of destructive cloning/copying.

Via Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies.